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without making the third person a party, may vouch him in by
giving him sufficient notice of the pendency of the suit and by
offering him the opportunity to control the defense. 99 Whether or
not the third person chooses to accept, he would then be held bound
by the judgment. This procedure, however, may only be used when
the person sought to be vouched in is the indemnitor of the defendant.
In C. K. S. Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc.,' °0 the
plaintiff retailer sought to recover the amount paid by him in
settlement of a separate action for personal injuries sustained when
a blouse sold by the plaintiff caught fire. The plaintiff, claiming
that the defendant was the manufacturer of the blouse and, therefore, through an implied warranty of fitness, an indemnitor, vouched
him in.
In reversing an order of the lower court, the appellate division,
first department, held that in the subsequent indemnification action
it was proper for the defendant to show that he was not the plaintiff's indemnitor and, therefore, that he could not be vouched in.10
The court noted, however, that had it been conclusively established
below that the defendant was an indemnitor, he could not here
deny liability by contesting facts already established. 0 2 Had it
been determined that the defendant was the plaintiff's indemnitor,
he would have been bound by that decision in the subsequent indemnification action.
CPLR 1025:

Limited partner cannot sue derivatively on behalf
of his partnership.
In Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch.,03 the second circuit permitted limited partners to sue on behalf of the partnership
after the general partners had rendered themselves unable to sue
by placing the partnership in the hands of a liquidator allegedly
affiliated with the defendants.
Though it has been suggested that New York law would be
influenced by Klebanow,0 4 in Millard v. Newmark & Co., 0 - the
appellate division, first department, in a 3-2 decision, held that 32
of 100 limited partners could not maintain a derivative suit on
behalf of the partnership. The majority in Millard distinguished
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100 25 App. Div. 2d 218, 268 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1st Dep't 1966).
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218,0 263 N.Y.S2d 409 (1st Dep't 1966).
2 2 Id. at 220, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
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Klebanow by stating that the federal court must have "overlooked
the fact that the New York legislature has not so extended the
law as to limited partnerships." 106 The court reasoned that a
limited partnership is solely the creature of statute,1 7 having only
such rights, duties and obligations as the statutes and its contracts
may provide. 08 Therefore, since the legislature did not see fit to
endow a limited partner with the right to sue derivatively in the
name of the partnership, the court could not do so.1"" The court
thus strictly interpreted Section 115 of the New York Partnership
Law and therefore limited CPLR 1025, which permits a suit by or
against two or more partners in the partnership name.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rabin stated that if the majority
opinion was followed, there would then be no adequate remedy for
wrongs committed by the general partners against the partnership.
In urging that Klebanow be followed, he reasoned that a limited
partner would be unable to maintain an individual action because
of the difficulty of assessing and proving his personal loss. He
noted that even if the limited partner could prove his loss, the
remedy would remain inadequate since it was of greater interest to
the limited partner to see the partnership maintain a firm and
sound fiscal position. This greater interest, said Justice Rabin,
"could not be protected by relegating the limited partner to a suit
solely on his own behalf for his own specific damage." 110 He
insisted that if the majority view were followed, the general partners could "loot the partnership with impunity.. ..
111
"

ARTICLE 14-

ACTIONS BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS
Contribution between joint tort-feasors not apportioned on a strictly nuithematical basis.
In McCabe v. Century Theatres, Inc.,"1 12 the plaintiff was injured when she fell through open sidewalk doors leading to the
cellar of a store operated by Adolph Rohde, a subtenant of Queens
Park Operating Corporation. The building was owned by Grupenel
Realty Corporation. Grupenel and Queens Park, while contending
that together they should pay one-half of the judgment, nevertheless paid two-thirds of the amount in order to end the accrual of
interest. They then moved, pursuant to CPLR 1401, to recover,
CPLR 1401:
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